INTRODUCTION
Hospital outbreaks of Gram-negative bacteria resistant to multiple antibiotics have been reported in a number of contexts, particularly in areas where seriously ill patients are treated, for example in intensive care and special care baby units [1. 2] and in oncology units [3] , sometimes with spread to other wards [4] . In renal units, patients are often immunocompromised by underlying disease or by immunosuppressive therapy, but renal unit outbreaks of antibiotic-resistant bacteria have emphasized the role of Gram-positive organisms, such as vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) [5] rather than of Gram-negative organisms. We report an outbreak of infections due to multiple-resistant Gramnegative bacteria in a renal unit which involved a number of different species and involved the spread of a single plasmid of 105 kb between several unrelated bacterial species.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Background to the outbreak
The outbreak took place in a tertiary referral renal unit within an undergraduate teaching hospital over an 18 month period between March 1992 and August 1993.
* Author for correspondence. Ami, amikacin; Gen, gentamicin; Net, netilmicin; Cip, ciprofloxacin; Aug, co-amoxyclav: Cxm, cefuroxime; Ctz, ceftazidime; Azt, aztreonam; Pip, piperacillin; Imi, imipenem.
The renal unit housed 33 beds out of a total hospital complement of 520 beds. The unit had a longstanding, although relatively minor, problem with VRE, but apart from a few sporadic and apparently unrelated isolates with moderate antibiotic resistance, there was no history of isolation of multiple-resistant Gram-negative microorganisms until March 1992. In March 1992 bacteria resistant to multiple antibiotics were recovered from the urine specimens of six patients. There were representatives of Pseudomonas putidia, Enterobacter aerogenes and Escherichia coli, and although the antibiograms differed between species, most strains were resistant to gentamicin, netilmicin, aztreonam, piperacillin, ceftazidime and ciprofloxacin; only imipenem was active against almost all isolates (Table 1) .
Isolation and identification of antibiotic-resistant bacteria
Bacteria were isolated from clinical specimens using standard diagnostic methods. Organisms were identified by their API-20E biochemical properties (API Systems, La Balme Les Grottes, Montalieu-Vercieu, France). Representative isolates of E. coli were serotyped at the Laboratory of Enteric Pathogens (LEP), Central Public Health Laboratory, Colindale based on their somatic (O) and flagellar (H) antigens according to the method of 0rskov and 0rskov [6] .
Screening for resistance to antibacterial drugs
Antibiotic susceptibility testing was performed by the method of Stokes [7] on all Gram-negative organisms isolated in the renal unit of St Mary's Hospital. London over the 18-month period March 1992-August 1993. Antibiotics screened included amikacin, aztreonam, ceftazidine, ciprofloxacin, gentamicin, imipenem. netilmicin and piperacillin. Coliforms resistant to these antibiotics were subsequently screened for resistance to ampicillin, chloramphenicol, gentamicin. kanamycin, streptomycin, sulphonamides, tetracyclines, trimethoprim. nalidixic acid and rifampicin using the methods of Anderson and Threlfall [8] and Ward and colleagues [9] .
Management of the outbreak
Standard infection control measures were applied to patients with multiple resistant bateria; these comprised isolation in single rooms whenever possible, and use of disposable aprons and gloves by staff in direct contact with the patient. The variety of bacterial species involved made the role of an environmental reservoir unlikely and so none was sought, and because of the large number of bacteriology specimens routinely submitted by the unit, case-finding was not considered necessary. As far as practicable, an attempt was made to limit the use of broadspectrum antibiotics. The range of bacterial species involved in the outbreak prompted examination for plasmid-mediated antibiotic resistance. A selection of isolates representing the different species was therefore submitted to the LEP for molecular studies and plasmid characterization. Following the identification of a putative 'plasmid' outbreak, a survey of the hospital pharmacy records was initiated with particular reference to the use of aztreonam and ceftazidime.
Transfer of antibiotic resistance and plasmid characterization
Thirty-five multiple-resistant strains representative of isolates from different sites and different antibiograms (R-types) were tested for the ability to transfer resistance at both 28 °C and 37 °C to E. coli K12 F~ lac" rifampicin-resistant (riP) (= 20R764) or when rifampicin-resistant, to a strain of E. coli K12 with high level resistance (>500mg/l) to streptomycin (Str r ) (=1R716). The methods were those of Anderson and Threlfall [8] and counter-selection was exercised with rifampicin (100mg/l) or streptomycin (500 mg/1) as appropriate. When no transfer of resistance was detected, mobilization of drug resistance determinants was attempted by standard methods [8] , using the conjugative plasmids X (63 kb, Inc F n ) and A (90 kb, Inc IJ. Where possible, plasmids were tested for the ability to coexist with standard plasmids of defined compatibility groups [10] and on this basis were assigned to incompatibility groups in accordance with the scheme of Grindley and colleagues [11] .
Extraction and fingerprinting of plasmid DNA
Plasmid DNA was extracted by a modification of the method of Kado and Liu [12] as described by Threlfall and colleagues [13] . Following electrophoresis at 100 V for 3 h on horizontal (BRL H5 Horizontal Gel Apparatus) Tris-borate agarose gels (0-7% w/v, Sigma Chemical Co. Ltd) and visualization under UV illumination after staining with ethidium bromide, relative molecular mass (M T ) was determined in relation to plasmids of 147, 63, 35-8 and 6-9 kb, carried in E. coli K12, strain 39R861 [14] . For restriction enzyme analysis, suitably purified plasmid DXA extracted as described by Threlfall and colleagues [15] was digested with the restriction enzymes EcoR I and Pst I in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer (Gibco BRL).
RESULTS
Types of bacteria involved
In the 2 years following the isolation of the first multi-resistant organisms, 29
strains of E. coli, 4 of Enterobacter cloacae, 11 of K. pneumoniae, 2 ofCitrobacter spp. 
Antibiotic usage
Pharmacy computer records provided details of the unit's use of antibiotics. The unit used little ceftazidime and piperacillin but substantial use was made of aztreonam. In the 6 months prior to the outbreak an average of 380 grams of aztreonam was used in each month and for the first 5 months of the outbreak between 300 and 400 grams of aztreonam were being used in the unit per month: however, after the identification of a putative 'plasmid' outbreak usage of this antibiotic was substantially reduced and from November 1992 to August 1993 less than 150 grams per month of aztreonam was prescribed for use in the unit (Fig.  1) . The use of aztreonam was in pronounced contrast to all other areas of the hospital, very few of which ever used aztreonam although both ceftazidime and piperacillin had widespread occasional usage. The usage of ceftazidime in the unit, although never as substantial as that of aztreonam, was also reduced from between 100 and 150 grams per month in the early stages of the outbreak to between 50 and 100 grams per month for the 11 month period from October 1992 to August 1993 (data not shown). 
Plasmid analysis
Bacteria from the outbreak were found to harbour up to 6 plasmids and 11 plasmid profile types (PPTs) were identified ( Table 2) . For the E. coli isolates, these PPTs have been designated Ai through to Av (on the basis of a plasmid of 4-5 kb common to all strains), B and C; for Klebsiella spp., the PPTs have been designated Di and Dii, for Citrobacter spp., E and for Enterobacter spp., F. Analysis of plasmid content was confined to selected strains within these plasmid profile types which had been isolated in the period ending March 1993, and these are included in Figure 2 Common to almost all strains of E. coli, Citrobacter spp. and Enterobacter spp. were plasmids of approximately 105-120 kb which, in conjugation experiments, were associated with transmission of resistance to aztreonam, ceftazidime. piperacillin (ACP), ampicillin and chloramphenicol, and in some strains to trimethoprim (Table 3) . When tested for the ability to coexist with standard plasmids of denned compatibility groups, all of five 105-120 kb plasmids from strains of E. coli tested, and the plasmids of 114 and 105 kb from strains of Citrobacter spp. and Enterobacter spp. were incompatible with standard plasmids of the F. 2 incompatibility group.
Restriction endonuclease digests using the enzymes EcoR I and Pst I confirmed the molecular relatedness of these plasmids, and the EcoR I-generated fingerprints of plasmids of 105-120 kb from strains of E. coli of PPTs Ai, Aiii, Av and B, and from one strain oi Citrobacter spp. of PPT E are shown in Figure 2 . As a plasmid of 105 kb was found in 19 of 24 strains of E. coli and in the Enterobacter spp. strains, it is possible that this plasmid represents the archetypal plasmid involved in the outbreak. Although, as shown in Table 2 , 105-120 kb plasmids were not found in strains oi Klebsiella spp., these strains contained plasmids of approximately 150 kb also associated with transmission of ACP resistance. However, comparison of the EcoR I and Pst I fingerprints of one of the 150 kb Klebsiella spp. plasmids with those of plasmids of 105-120 kb from E. coli and Citrobacter spp. demonstrated a degree of molecular relatedness (Fig. 2) . Furthermore, in incompatibility tests, some incompatibility with Inc F u plasmids was demonstrable. A 105 kb plasmid was also detected in some strains of multiple-resistant Pseudomonas spp. involved in the outbreak; however this plasmid was not subjected to restriction endonuclease typing nor to incompatibility grouping.
Spread within the hospital
During the 18 months of the outbreak, no organisms resembling those reported in this study were isolated from patients outside the renal unit.
Results of interventions
Standard infection control precautions had no noticeable effect on the frequency of new patient-isolates of multiple-resistant bacteria. When molecular analysis revealed the existence of closely-related plasmids mediating resistance to ACP in a number of unrelated organisms, attempts were made to reduce the amount of aztreonam used on the unit. Following this the incidence of isolates of multiple resistant organisms was greatly reduced (Fig. 1) .
DISCUSSION
The progressive appearance of a number of bacterial species with multiple antibiotic resistance is characteristic of a 'plasmid' outbreak, in which a readily transmissible plasmid spreads between species. The subsequent acquisition by such plasmids, of resistance genes from other plasmids present within the bacterial cell has been described for non-fermenting Gram-negative rods [16] and recipient organisms may then display a variety of antibiograms. In this study, a putative archetypal Inc F u plasmid of 105 kb was present in 19 of 24 strains of E. coli isolated from different patients and belonging to at least five serotypes, and also in strains of Enterobacter spp. from two further patients. Closely-related plasmids probably derived from this archetypal plasmid were identified in strains of E. coli from a further five patients and in a strain of Citrobacter spp. from a sixth patient. A plasmid of 150 kb from two strains oi Klebsiella spp. also showed some degree of molecular relatedness and may also have been derived from the 105 kb plasmid during the course of the outbreak.
The ' plasmid outbreak' described here is of particular interest because within a relatively short period of time a 105 kb plasmid infected a range of bacterial species, in which E. coli played the major role. This contrasts with the emphasis placed by others on the central role of Serratia spp. and Klebsiella spp. in plasmidmediated outbreaks [17] . We did not encounter Serratia spp., which is in any case an unusual cause of nosocomial infection in the UK, and although there were some isolates oi Klebsiella spp., they did not appear until later in the outbreak.
The ability of the 105 kb plasmid in our outbreak to pass readily from one species to another presented an initially confusing picture. The near-simultaneous appearance of a variety of multi-resistant organisms diverted attention from a straightforward explanation of cross-infection, and suggested rather that several independent outbreaks of infection due to multiple-resistant bacteria were taking place simultaneously; the large number of interhospital transfers received by the unit made plausible such an hypothesis. The spread of the plasmid among the unit's bacterial flora, some of which contained several plasmids and possessed a variety of other antibiotic resistances ( Table 3 ) prevented recognition that the transmission of linked resistance to aztreonam, ceftazidime and piperacillin was the underlying cause of the outbreak.
The inability of routine methods to demonstrate that patients were colonized with identical plasmids although in different bacterial hosts, hindered any epidemiological understanding and limited hypotheses that could be made concerning spread and potential reservoirs of infection. Outbreaks of antibioticresistant Gram-negative bacteria attributed to environmental reservoirs have often involved a single strain of environmental origin such as Pseudomonas spp., Acinetobacter spp. and Serratia spp. [3, [18] [19] [20] . The prominence of man-adapted E. coli and the involvement of the wide range of species in our outbreak, argued against an environmental source and suggested that investigation of patients and the environment was unlikely to be fruitful. In practice cross-infection control measures were not compromised by the absence of an identified source of infection, as all patients with multiple-resistant bacteria were subjected to the same crossinfection control procedures.
Price and Sleigh provided evidence in 1970 that the reduction in use of an antibiotic to which bacteria are resistant may terminate an outbreak [21] , although this strategy has not always been successful [22] . Success has also been claimed with other methods of control such as intestinal decontamination with non-absorbable antibiotics [4] . At the onset of our outbreak, the possible contributory role of antibiotic usage and the need to avoid unnecessary therapy was accepted as a matter of general principle. However, a wide-ranging limitation of antibiotic therapy was not possible because of the susceptibility to infection of many of the unit's patients and recommendations about specific agents were not possible in view of the large number of different resistances encountered. The dramatic reduction in the incidence of multiply-resistant Gram-negative organisms following change in aztreonam usage suggests that our outbreak was dependent on this antimicrobial and indicates that despite being a relatively narrow-spectrum agent -with useful activity only against facultative Gramnegative bacteria -aztreonam may disrupt the microbial environment as much as broader-spectrum agents.
The eventual confirmation that a single plasmid (or group of closely-related plasmids probably derived from a single archetypal plasmid) was present in the majority of multiply-resistant isolates, and the identification of its associated antibiotic resistances coupled with the unit's antibiotic usage data, led to a reasoned decision to limit use of aztreonam. However, this decision could be reached only after substantial work on the genetic composition of the bacteria and repeated examination of the pharmacy computer records. Whilst computerized pharmacy information is likely to be available in most modern hospitals, detailed investigation of antibiotic resistance mechanisms requires skills and resources available in few centres. Indeed, to our knowledge this study provides the first documented demonstration of how molecular studies can provide the impetus to reduce the usage of specific antibiotics in an outbreak situation. Regrettably, until more rapid means of characterizing transmissible resistance elements are available, it is likely that outbreaks such as the above will continue to be take much time to analyse and control.
